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L Introduction
Statxlard measures of corporate peribrmance focus on returns to shzueholdem: historical
performance is denoted by returns on assets or equity, whik stock prices reflect the anticipation of
such returns in the fbtwe. Researchers in strategic management have gendly taken these
shareholder returns as the appropriate measures of corporate p erfbrmance to be maximized. But the
field of str~egic managment has also viewed the business corporation more brozlly as a vehicle for
vak creaion. The valm cre~ed by the fm is distributed not only to its shaeholden, but also to
other stakholde~, including managers, workers, and customers. 1 Long term success requires that
this brotier set of stakeholders receive some portion of the vak cr~ed by the f- Indeed, in
Japrn and other countries, empbyees are oi%m considered more irnpmtant than equity owmrs
within the hiemrchy of company stakeholdem.2
Most research to date on the stakeholder perspective has been conceptual; thexe have been
very few atttrnpts to make empirical assessments.3 This paper presents a simple metkdology for
estirnatingthe t otal vak cre@ed by a company and the distribution of this vak among the fm’s
majm st akeholdem. We show, moreover, that public data obtained from corporate fmmcial reports
can ofk serve as the bask for these computations.4 We ibtrate the metkdology in an
international context with a u)mparison of US and Japimse automotive companies. Our
computation show rnajm difkrences in vak creztion and its distribution between Amezkan and
‘ This brwxkr view of coqotie stabholdess has been a growing theme in the man~unew liteature. Recent
contibuticns andsurwys includeBlair(19%), Donaldson(19%), Hill (1992) and Jon= (1995).
2Clak (1979), Itami (1987).
3 One exc.qtion is Chaluavarthy (1986).
4 Our methodology is an cxtensim of txisting concqts ofvahwaided accounting. See, for example, McKeay(1983)
and Purdy (1983).
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Jap~ese f-, as well as between highly -successfid and les.s-successfid producers within each
country .
The presentaticm is in two main parts. First, we desaibe how a fmn’s vak creation, and its
distribution amorg stakholden, can be measured at a giverI point in time We show, moreover, that
valm cr~ion is closely relaed to the concept of productivity. The second part of the pap cr
desaibes how gains can be measured over time This allows a computation of the bendlts flowing
to consumers. The paper concludes with a discussion of factors that at%ct the power of various
st akeholde~ to appropriate the vak cr@ed by the fm
IL Measuring COIQOrate Value and Its Distribution at a Spetific Point in Time
The basis for our analysis is the fro’s “value-added” during a givm period of time Valw-
addcd is defined as the diflkrence between the fm’s sales rewmue and its total cost of purchased
matuials, eneqy, and services. Th~ vak-added is the revenue contribution attributable to labor
and capital within the firm Value-added corresponds directly with the incomes of the various
stakeholders in the corporation. It can be most easily computed by summin g up the components
of the fm’s revenue which are distributed to labor and capital, plus the portion captured by
govanrnent in the form of taxcolkztions
Value-added = .hbor compensation+ returm to cqoital+ taxpaymen~ (togovernnuvuj;
whexe
Labw com~nsaticm =
Retzms to captal =
Taxpaynents =
wages + sala-ies + bom.ses + bent$h;
depreciate + net income a$w taxes;
income tares + payroll ttues + propr@ taxes + mist taxer.
Figure 1 illustrates how General Motors in 1985, a year in which the company reported
an unusually detailed breakdown of its expenses, distributed its value-added among the categories
of stakeholders mentioned above.
worker of roughly $100,000. Of
The Figure shows that in 1985, GM had
this total, about half was “value-added”; a
total revenue per
tiny tlaction was
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“other income,”5 and the remainder was paid out by the firm for materials, energy, and various
services provided by outside vendors. Of GMs “value-added component, about two-thirds was
paid to labo~ the balance went for equipment depreciation, taxes, and the firm’s net income.
Value-added is a measure of gross valu creation, and its magnitude can be compared across
companies. But such comparisons are not particularly meaningfi.d, as difkrences in company size
and vertical int ~ation are the primary det ami.nants of difikrences in corporate vak-added For
more insightfid compariso~ some form of ratk analysis is required. b In the automotive indmtry
one seerni.ngly-&traclive ratb is va.k-added p er vehicle produced. Unfortunately, inter-fro
diff&rences in avemge vehkle size quality characteristics, and vertical integration make the
interpretation of this rat b problematic An alternative ratb, value-added per emp by ee, is the
benchmark which we apply in this study. Valw=dded per empbyee, which is equivalent to labor
productivity, has a murk of salient features: (1) it can be applied to any company regzdless of
industry; (2) it provides a direct measure of fm efl%iency; and (3) national wealth creation (incon
per cap its) is dinztly linked to Iabcx product ivity. Thus unlike corporate profits, growth in value-
addcd per emp loyee represents an unambiguous contribution to natbnal economic wehre.
Compriwm of Autanotive Cmqmnhs
The fmns in our sample are: Toyota Nis~ and the “big three” US auto producers. We
fust consider how vab-added was distributed in each of these companies in 1978 and 1988. The~
in Section III, we examine how the gains in productivity over the perbd from 1978 to 1988 were
distributed We have chosen the yeas 1978 and 198a as both were near peaks in automobile sales,
which allows cyclical effects on productivity to be lar@y dkgarded.
Figure 2 gives labor productivity (measured as vak-added per worker, in US dolhrs, based
on the prevailingrnadmt exclxwqy rate of 210 yen per dollar) for each of the six companies in 1978.
5For the American fms in our sample, we have defined “other income” to consist of interest and dividend income,
net of interest expense. By netting out interest expense, we have minimized the size of “other income” and
simplified our analysis by eliminating consideration of creditors as a claimant on value-added Analysis of non-
automotive companies, in which financial income does not completely o&t interest expense, might include debt-
holders in the analysis.
bRatios are also required for meaningful profit comparisons, e.g., return on sales, return on assets, return on equity.
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The Fi~e allws inttr-fm comparisons of total vak-added per worker as well as the distributicm
of this rwmue among stakeholdexs.
Figure 2 shows that them was substantial productivity variation among the autcsnakers in
1978. Toyaa had the higkst labcr procbctivity and Chrysler the lowest. Indeed, Chxyskr was on
the verg of bankruptcy in the late 1970s; virtually all the company’s revmue was paid out to
Iabcr, leaving nothing as a retun to capital. Returns to capital, which are correlated with
proktivity, varkd dramatically among the companies. In 1978, average compensatia per work
was higher in the US than in Japm.
Figure 3 shows vak-added perempbyee for the five autanakers one dede lata, in 1988.
The Fi~e su~ts that Japmeae procbcers had higher labcr procbctivity than US companies in
that year. However, this is mainly duet o the very high p roductivity of Toy da which remains an
outlier among the Japmese prockers. Indeed, the data in Figures 2 and 3 show that the
proktivity variation amo~ firm within each cQuntry was lar~.’
Fi~e 3 shows that the difkence in Iabcr compensatim between the US and Japm had
virtually dkqpeared by 1988. In that year the avenge compensation per worker was very simik
for all five firm. However, the proportion of vak-added distributed to lab= varkd gredy among
the companies.
While theretu-ns to Mm were similar in the five companies in 1988, the returns to capital
were not. To detanine whetk fkms were cr-ing” excess” vak (or” ecxmomicrents”) for their
shareholders, each company’s cost of capital must be subtracted born the returns to capital shown
in Fi~es 2 and 3. Such calculation of “eunomic vak added” (EVA) are bey cmdthe scope of this
paptr.g But rou@ cxxnputatiom show that Toy~a earned retwns vastly in extxss of its capital
costs, whereas the otk firma earmxl
gmxrally a #y ear for autanaks.
sh@tly more than their costs of capiud in 1988, which was
- Thecom@sonbemeen US andJapmesecompmka dependsin pm on the assuned exchmgerare In Figues 2 and
3 we haveused* prewiling markt excismge tie but an aksnaive choke would be a” ptmking poww pariy” rate
which attanpts to equaiim the prias of spe4ificgoock (ammobik) in the two couxsries.
8l%e methodology for computing “economic value added” is described in Tully (1993).
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Figures 2 and 3 also show the distributia of value captured by the gwenment in the form
of tawa. As exp=ed, these tax collections are strcngly correlated with the returns to capital.
Toy ctz with its disproportionately lar~ net incxxne,paid by farthemost tams per employee.
IIL Measuring Gains OverTime
The previous section described how to assess a fu-rn’s value-added and its distribution
among stakeholdem in a givm yeac In this section we consider the growth of vabadded over time
The spedic example focuses on changys in the five auto makrs’ val~added over the period,
197$88.
As Mm prmktivity tits (hopefhily ) over tirnq vabadded per workd grows, increasing
the potential incune available to the stakeholders, as considered in the previous secdon. Them is,
however, a complication: the’’ real” price of theprcxkxt may fall thereby transferring some or all of
the prochctivity gain to consumers. A-din@y, we include estimates of consumer benefits in our
estimates of the dktributicn of prockwtivity gains overtime
To compare valw-added overtime it is necessq to select appropriate price deflators. Two
dif%rent measures of price ch~ are rehwant. The first is the price of the furn’s output--in this
case motcr vehicles. Each fm’s nominal valw-addd measured in current dollars, must be
discxmnted to refkct ch~ in mot- vehicle prias. The seund inflation measure is the average
economy-wide incxeasein pri=, as meamred by the consumer pricE ind~ or more gmerally, the
GDP (gps domtstic prodmt) deflator. Such a deflator adjusts for ch~ in the buyrng pow= of
a given amotmt of cuxmncy. The real incunes of works, shamholdas and the ~venment are
directly tied to this inflation measure, hoking nominal quantities fd.
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The dif%-ence bet- the economy -wick.measure of i.nflatio~ and the inflation measure
rehmnt to company output, provides a measure of consumer @ns.g A firm or industry that ~ts
prices rapidly (or raises its prices more slowly than otha sectors of the economy) delivers inmased
vak to consumers. Consider, for -le, the case of an economy with zero inflation, excluding
the price of autanobiles. A car of given quality initially costs $10,000. If auto prim fall by 10?40,
consumers enjoy a @m for the same dollar expmditure they can buy a higher-pertiormamx vehicle,
or they can buy the same car and sped the $1000 savings on otha @.
As an alttrnate example, assune that auto companies collude and raise their prices by 10?4o
rekive to any price ch~ for the economy as a whole. In this case consumers suflkr welfhre
losses--they must give up 10% more of their red incune to purchase a car. These consumer losses
flow as gains to shareholders of the auto companies, who now enjoy g-er returns in the form of
higher profits. 10 Empk)yees maybe able to capture some part of these gains if labcr compensation
is linked to h profitability (e.g, mamqpnent bonwes and stock options), or if labor unicns exert
pow=.
A SpeG”fic Exunple
Tabk 1 shows how thegmvth in value-added and its distibuticn among stakeholdess can be
computed, usingthe Ford Motm Company between 1978 and 1988 as an -le. The yeaxs 1978
and 1988 repntwmt comparable points in the autanotive business cycle By comparing values in
these two btdtmark yeas, we can obtti reasonable mea.wres of chaxqys over time
Us@ the Pro&cer Prim Ind= for motcx vehkks, we estinate that in the absuwe of any
productivity ~, Ford’s nominal vabadded per work wouki have rism by 61.&6 over the
decde. It is theincsease in vahx+added per empbyee beycmd this purdy inflatiomuy effect which
9This masm isan approximation of tk consumer’s surplus concept described in tk economics Memture. S+
brexaqle, Willig (19%) and WUtzman(1988).
10While most of the consumer loss flows as a gain to shareholders, tire is also a “deadweight loss” of welt% horn
conswnem who choose not to buy a car at the higher prices. Such deadweight losses or “welihre triangles” =
ignored in the cwrent analysis. Also, part of the transfer from consume= is capnued by government in the form cf
Clx-potateincome taxes.
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represents Ford’s gain in procbctivity, or valw cr~ion. Acuxding to our caladations, thk real
procbctivity gainwas rou~ly $28~00, measured hi 1988 dollars.
To see how much incanes at Ford incxeased,we applied the GDP prh deflator, a measure
of overall inflation in the economy. The %ntrai levei of prim in the US, as indicated by this ind~
rose 72°/0between 1978 and 1988 (i.e, the general price led rose about 10°/0more than autanobile
prices). By this measurq Fords 1978 Mm compensation was equivalent to rou~ly $40,000 per
employ ee in 1988 dollars. Actual lalxr compensation in 1988 exceeded this figure by $7,300 per
work. Similar calculations are shown for the gains allocated as returns to capital and to
~vcrnment tax authorities.
Over the 1978-1988 period, the total @ns @&to lalxx, capital and tam amoumd to
$25500 per employee. This is about $27~ less than the estbated procbctivity gain The
d.if%rence,which we impute to consumers, is a consequence of the fact that the “red” quality-
adjusted price of motcr vehicles rose more siowly than ~tnl pri~ inflation. (In other words,
Ford’s revmue per employee was rou@ly $27~ less than it woukl have been had Ford been able to
raise vehicle p ricxs at the same rate as -sal inflation.) This $2700 was, therefore, not available to
Ford’s empbyees or stockholder; instx it flowed to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Thu% we can accmnt for Ford’s total prcxktivity gain as follows: 25% went to employees in
form of higkr w- and ben&lts, 45% repnwmted an increase in the return to ca.pit~ 18’XO
corresponded to an incnmse in tam paid by Ford and 10% represented a gain enjoyed by
consumers in the form of low= real vehicle pricxs.
Co~”son of AnlWwtiwCowqmnies
Ford’s distibuticn of 197$1988 prcxktivity @ns are shown graphically in Fi~e 4 and
compared with similar computations for GM, Chrysler, Toy aa and Nkan. Several conclusions
can be drawn from these data
. The 197&1988 producdvity @m have been shared to some degree across all the
stakeholder gpups: emp by ees, shareholders, gmxnxnent and consumers.
. Consumers in Japm captured a largr shate of the bemfks from auto indust~
prockxtivity ~owth than did American consumers. This is true when consumer gins are
meamred in eitim absolute terms (dollars per worker), or as a proportion of the total gain in
prodxtivity. The reason for this pattern is that real auto prices fell faster in Japm than in
the US.ll
l Labu benefits have been weakiy but positively relaed to the ma@tude of procbctivity
gains made by thei empby er. Toy ~Z which had the largst p rocbctivity gtins, gave the
kqyst incxeasein empbyee compensation; GM, with the smallest procbctivity gains, gave
the smallest w- and bemflt incnxtse. But despite this correlation with company
prcxhctivity, ch~ in lalxx compensatim were fairly similar acrcas the fu-rm, su~sting
that W* and sakes are laqyly set by market fores (and ne@iations with natknd
unims in the case of the Ameican firms).
The retuns to empbyees can be fhrther subdivided into classes of workers, inckd.i.ng
houtiy, Sdtied and top man~ent . The fmmcial repats for the auto companies vary in the
@ent to which they pernit such an analysis. One labcr compensation issue of considerabk interest
is the chief exeuitive’s pay. Particdtrly controversial during the 1980s was the compensation of
Lee _ whose earr@ thraigh stock options exceeded the premilingnorms of the day .12
Our anaiysis provides some perspective on this CEO compensatim issw. We find that
whi.k US auto executive pay levels may have been hi@ in absdut e tenm, they have constituted a
rnimscuie f-ion of each fi.rnfs vabadded In 198Q the year of peak mmpensatim for Lee
Iacxxa at Chrysler, his comptmsaticn of $20.5 million amounted to just over two+mths of one
pemnt of Chrysles’s vabadded (or $179 per empbyee). At the othtr extmne, Rogs Smith’s
“Thea ppmchusedto oqrtetkestiWea in Figue4talces eonmmergaimas anindumyeikzwithn-
courq, = domtstic prodmxs zc assuned to ehage idetied pries hr their outpt. Tk met.lsxiolo~ cm be
extmded to allow consumer gins to wny amo~ eonqxmies. For exarrqlq in maikts with dilbmtiaed pmckxts,
tirrra may chage di&ent prima, zijmting fbr quahty. A h which * its quality4..ed pric wouki gain
made shae whik mgistaing some dmp in mvetme (vabadckd) per unit of outpt. Givm suitable assunptiorx the
ynsumergaim speti!icto edfhrnembe tstinule4b=d oncbarges inrnarkts-
Stock option compensation is rmt a component of the firm’s value add@ stock options become valuable given an
ixwreasein expectations of i%turereturns to slurelmldem. Supplementary calculations aIE t&n#oR necessary to add
the value of stock option compensation to salary and bonus pay.
9
peak annual compensation of$4.49 million in 1988 amomted to Iessthan one-hundredth of one
percent of GM’s value-added (or $5.86 per employ-ee). If top e~tives do have a majcr effmt on
their company’s weaith creaioz then sucoAid executives are capturing only a small part of the
return to their efhts.
IV. Factors Influencing the Distribution of Gains
Prim rewarchers in str~egic management snd ec-omxnicshave asked the question: Who
captures the finds ecoxmmicrents?13 Are rents appropriated by man~rs and workers, or do they
~ to the fro’s shareholders? The franmvork devdoped in this paper embeds this question in a
Iargx context of valm crwio~ where @m flow also to the firm’s customers. Indeed, rents area
subset of vak cr~ion--+ents may be dissipated by competition whid shills the value to
consumers as prices fall Thu% the issue of rent app mpriation can be viewed as a component of the
hr~ question of vaiue appropriatkn by the firm’s stakeholdem.
Thevak cr-ed by thefm overa perbd of time is exdy equivalent to its (appropriately
meamred) prodxtivity gain If this incnmxmtal vak can be mtiained ss Marshailian or
monopoly rents, it is available to internal stakeholders (~s, workers and shaxeholdem).14
Othenvise, the incxeznentai vak flom to consumers in the form of prim reductions (or
akenatively, improvements in qurdity witlmut cmesponding increases in prim).
The ecoxmmist’s ideal of welfwe maximization involves rent appropriation just sufficient to
compensate internal stakeholdess for the inpas they provide. For exanple, man- and workers
with sup tier skils capture Marshallian rents equal to the marlet value of thek skill preni~ and
possibly an addiional, contin~t rewad to motivate optimal efht. Sluueholdess are compensated
forthecost of capkaL appropriately adjwted for risk Monopoly rents may be justifkd whexethey
rep resent retuns to innovation and risk taking (e.g, patents) and such rewads are necessay to
mot ivate similar behavior in the fitue. The economist’s notion of welikre maximization requires
‘3 See, fix example, Barney (1986), Rumelt (1987), Rose (1987), Machin (1991), Bmdbwd and Pugel (1991),
Fjm-af(1993), Van Reemm ( 19%).
See Peteraf(1993) for a discussion
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that all additional value creztion flow to consume~ as the natural outcome of competitive market
processes.
In prais market impefecticns commonly arise, and the distributim of the productivity
@n is infhenced by various of factors. These include competition smong prod.icers, lalm market
forces, the bar@ning power of workers, and decisions by internal stakeholders r-ding the fair
disrributim of gains. If dom=tic pro&cers achieve similar gains in proci.xtivity while competing
aggressively, most of the vak cr~ed will flow forward to consumers in the form of lower priax.
In less competitive environments, bargining pow= and penxptions of fairness may influence the
distribution of gains. For example, lalxx uniats may be able to ne@iate for a largx proportion of
the surp1us,15at the expmse of consumers (hipjer auto prims), shareholders (lower corporate
profits) and the @vernment (lower corporate incune taxes).16 Our analysis su~sts that
gxnxnment taxrewmues will tend to be lowtst when domcst ic firms have sirdar procbctivity levds
and compete _sively with each other, thexeby forang corporate profits to unifixmly mcxkt
levels.
Typically, shareholders and other fmmcial investors capture only a small proportion of the
total VSIWcrexted by the enterprise. This is especially true in high technology industries where
firms are progressive but compete with intense rivahy, leading to price redxtions that cause the
procktivity @m to flow mosdy to consunxrs (at the expense of shareholder). From the
starrip oint of national welhre such v@ous cmnpetition and price red-ion is ~emlly preferable
to the sknative scaario with I@iy profitable but stagpant *.
Thus these is no necexmry cmnection between the amowit of valw creaed by the h
(productitiy) andthenet retwns to shareholders (pr&ltability ). But viewed acrcss firm within a
@t indwtry, prodxtivity and profitability tend to be correlated. Fi~e 5 is a graph showing the
‘5Rose (1987), Machin (1991).
“ConverMy, if wodcem permive that theY fd to =fie an equitable pmpornon of* @z P~@’ gKJWfi
may itself be jeopardized. Avarietyof gain-sharing methods have been proposcxl with the aim of using the returns
to gains as an **e fm prodwtivity improvement A useful collection of papers reviewing the empirical
evidemx canbe fburd in Blinder (1990). The earliest and best-knmm of gain-sharing plans is the Scanlon Plain
developed in tk 1930’s. For backgrouxuZ see Lesieur (1958). In a ditkmx veiz Weitzman (1984) argues for a
revenue shaing piaL which the author believes could dampen the business cycle as weU as enhamx producti~ity.
Profit sharing is another approack adopted by Ford and other companies in the 1980s.
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rel~ion betweem labm prodwtivity and retns to cap tial for the five auto companies in 1978 and
1988. The chaxqpsin these measures over the dede are also plotted. All comparisons have been
scakd rektive to Toy d% the top-p erforning f- The Fi~e su~ts a string temkncy for
prockmtivity difikrencxs to flow to the bottom line as profit diflkrentials.17 This arises becase lain
compensatim is more strcmgly in.tkenced by national market forces than by the rehive suc.uxwof
the firm
V. Conclusions and Limitations
We have shown that a comprehensive proktivity-based measure of corporate vak
crwion is relaively easy to compute and can be used to supplement more conventional measures of
firm ptiorman~ such as profit and market shae. Moraxwr, we have shown how prchctiviqr
@m at the firm level are translated into some combination of higkr w-, profits, taxs and
consumer bend%s. The US and Jap mese auto manufacturers exanined in this study show wide
variation in recent prodxtivity growth and the distributhm of prohtivity @m. Thae have been
lar~ dif%rencesamong f- within each comry, as well as between the US and Japm.
Inda in making intentional comparisons of companies’ perhxnancg it is prcxktivity
ratkx than profit that provides the more insightfid benchmark. Toycta exchded, Japtese
manufacturing companies are typkally much less profitable than their American mmterp arts, but
thei remdcable procktivity perkxmance in sectors such as auta and ekronics has shaped the
international competitivmess of the Jap mese ecawmy.
The metlmdol~ outhd in this study has a number of limitations. Our pro&ctivity -
based measures of value Crmion capture the bendlts flowing to most but not all, of the
stakeholdexs in a corporation Omitted fkom our measures are the gains to more peripheral
stakehoiders, such as suppliers, venture partners, and comnuni ty goqs. Moreover, retuns to
empby ees in the form of stock optkxts are not formally includ~ as they are based on market
1’Bao (1989) and Riahi-Belkaoui (1994) show that stock prices ate mom strongly linked to company producti~ity
and value-added than to current profitability.
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estimates of fitme returns rather than historical value-added. But stock option compensation can be
asstssed in supplementiay cakadations.
The method described in this paper for estimating company prodxtivity and the
distribution of @s cannot be ready applied to all companies, since it wqures more infamation
than is ofttn publicly repated in the United States. To apply in eve~ respe@ it requires
undiversified companies opexating within a singe country. Companies must also be gemrous in
voluntady supplying supplemental infamation on lalxx costs, which are not a required item in US
accumtingp ractice. In Japm and many Eurcpean countries, acccunt ing p rocdures follow a value-
addtx!format, so thenewmuy dataareeasier to obtan.
The timtican companies which qualifi, nev=theless, are numtrous and imp atant. The
auxmobile manufacturtm whkh have been p resented as a demonstration are vital to the economies
of the US and Jap m. M ormver, the autanobile example demcmstratts that meaningfid results are
possible even for companies that deviate moderately iiom a onec.mmtxy, one prodxt ided.
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Table 1.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
1978 1988 ~
(1978 $) (1988 $) :
Per Worker II
Value-added* 33,319 # 82,909# [
I
Wages & Benefits 23,088 47,061 !
Return to Capital 5,760 22,911 :
Taxes 4,472 12,939 ;
Consumers
1978 Gain
(1988 $) (1988 $)
55,274 l ’ 28,246
39,782 * 7,279
9,924 * 12,987
7,705 l 5,234
2,746
28,246
# Includes net interest income and dividend income of $830 per employee
In 1978 and $2,041 in 1988.
l * Inflated to 1988 dollars using the PPI for motor vehicles
l Inflated to 1988 dollars using the GDP deflator
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